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NOTE
One Prong, Two Prong, Many Prongs: A
Look into the Economic Substance Doctrine
Klamath Strategic Investment Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures
v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009).
AMANDA L. YODER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost every federal circuit, as well as Congress, has weighed in on the
economic substance doctrine and attempted to clarify its boundaries. The
economic substance doctrine deals with transactions that, although technical-
ly in accord with the Internal Revenue Code (the Code or I.R.C.), were origi-
nally structured solely for tax avoidance purposes. The Internal Revenue
Service and courts dislike these transactions because they thwart the general
intent of Congress in enacting certain tax-saving Code provisions.2  Until
recent amendments to the 1.R.C., the federal circuits were split between two
different approaches to tax avoidance transactions, yet the application of the
two approaches was slightly unique in each circuit.3 There were many, albeit
unsuccessful, attempts to codify the economic substance doctrine in the past
ten years.4 Although there were several proposed bills, the language in each
proffered version was largely the same - effectively the same language that
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2006; M.B.A., University of Missouri, 2007;
J.D., University of Missouri School of Law, 2011; Note and Comment Editor, Mis-
souri Law Review, 2010-11. 1 am grateful to Professor Michelle Arnopol Cecil for
her advice and guidance throughout this process and her continued dedication as an
educator. Special thanks to my family for their constant love and support during my
better half of a decade in school at the University of Missouri.
1. Donald L. Korb, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., Remarks at the
University of Southern California Tax Institute: The Economic Substance Doctrine in
the Current Tax Shelter Environment 6-7 (Jan 25, 2005), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/economic substance ( 125_05).pdf.
2. In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 106 (3d Cir. 2002).
3. See infra Part I1.
4. Debra J. Bennett, Economic Substance: Is Codification the Right Ideal,
TAXES, Feb. 1, 2010, at 7; see also H.R. 1265, 111th Cong. § 401 (2009); H.R. 2136,
110th Cong. § 401 (2007); H.R. 2625, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005); S. 1637, 108th
Congress § 401 (2003) (specifically referring to § 401(n)(1) & (n)(3)).
5. Bennett, supra note 4, at 7; see H.R. 1265, § 401; H.R. 2136, § 401; H.R.
2625, § 101; S. 1637, § 401 (specifically § 401(n)(1) and (3)).
1
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appears in the newly codified economic substance doctrine. The pertinent
portion reads:
(o) CLARIFICATION OF ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
DOCTRINE. - (1) APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE. - In the case
of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is re-
levant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic sub-
stance only if - (A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way
(apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic
position, and (B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from
Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.
These proposed bills, and now the newly codified doctrine, specify cer-
tain factors to be considered (such as profit potential)7 and the requirements
needed to find economic substance.
Although there was a majority forming as to which test to use, the cir-
cuit split was creating unrest among the lower courts. At times, even know-
ing which test a specific circuit used was not particularly helpful in guiding a
taxpayer. In addition, if a taxpayer planned incorrectly, he or she may have
faced severe tax penalties.9 Moreover, the different standards applied at the
appellate level made it difficult for the tax and district courts to assess partic-
ular transactions because the test applied by the court changed depending on
where the appeal was heard.10 Thus, the economic substance issue created
uncertainty for both taxpayers and courts and most recently surfaced in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit case Klamath Strategic Investment
Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States.1 1
6. Heath Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1409, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (West 2010)).
7. The newly codified statute defines potential for profit as follows:
The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into account in de-
termining whether the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of para-
graph (1) are met with respect to the transaction only if the present value
of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substan-
tial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that
would be allowed if the transaction were respected.
26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).
8. Id.
9. Bennett, supra note 4, at 7-8.
10. Id. at 8.
11. 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009) (case was heard jointly with Kinabalu Strategic
Inv. Fund ex rel. Rogue Ventures LLC v. United States).
1410 [Vol. 75
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Klamath Strategic Investment Fund involved two partners who
"represented the State of Texas in litigation against the tobacco industry."' 2
The outcome of this litigation provided the two partners, Cary Patterson and
Harold Nix, with a substantial increase in income - approximately thirty mil-
lion dollars each.13 Because of this influx of income, Nix and Patterson
looked into potential investment opportunities.14 Nix had previously devel-
oped an interest in investing in foreign currency transactions that were both
high risk and high reward investments.' 5 Patterson also became interested in
these foreign currency transactions and sought the counsel of a highly expe-
rienced businessman, Ed Cox, who frequently dealt with these types of com-
plex investment strategies.' 6 "Thereafter, Nix and Patterson jointly decided
to pursue . . . foreign currency" investments.17 Their primary motivation in
these transactions was to earn a profit.'8 The district court made note of Nix
and Patterson's delay in getting into these foreign investment strategies.' 9
The court felt that if their primary motivation had been tax avoidance only,
then Nix and Patterson would have begun their investments in 1999, when
they recognized the first of their substantial increases in income from the
tobacco litigation, instead of in 2000, when they actually began these transac-
-20tions.
After making the decision to invest, Nix and Patterson sought the help
of an accounting firm.21 This accounting firm held itself out as competent to
22
provide the type of investment advice the partners required.22 Nix and Patter-
son began to rely heavily on the accounting firm for their investment mat-
23ters. The accounting firm identified an investment advisory firm to help
24
with Nix and Patterson's investments. This advisory firm, Presidio Advi-
sory Services (Presidio), specialized in the foreign currency transactions that
12. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 540. Nix and Patterson were partners in the law firm of
Nix, Patterson & Roach, LLP located in Daingerfield, Texas. Klamath Strategic Inv.
Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (E.D. Tex 2007), affd in part
and vacated in part, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009).
13. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 540.
14. Id. at 541.
15. Klamath, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 888-89.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 889.
18. Id. at 891.
19. Id. at 891 n.9.
20. Id.






Yoder: Yoder: One Prong, Two Prong, Many Prongs
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
MSSOURILA WREVIEW
Nix and Patterson wanted to pursue.25 Presidio structured a transaction that
26
would take place in three stages. Each stage required the partners to invest
a greater amount of capital than the previous stage, which subsequently in-
27
creased the risk and return available to them. The three stages were spread
out over seven years.28 The investors were allowed to exit at the end of stage
one and every sixty days thereafter.29
To carry out this investment strategy for Nix and Patterson, Presidio
formed two limited liability companies (LLCs), Klamath and Kinabalu (the
Partnerships).30 This move was significant because limited liability compa-
nies are not automatically taxed as corporations, but instead are allowed to
choose the type of federal taxation classification that they will assume.
Presidio chose to have Klamath and Kinabalu taxed as partnerships.32 Presi-
dio then formed two single-member LLCs, 3 3 St. Croix and Rogue, which
were disregarded for federal income tax purposes and instead treated as sole
proprietorships. 34 Nix and Patterson each owned one hundred percent of his
respective single-member LLC.35 In turn, each single-member LLC owned
ninety percent of its respective Partnership, Klamath or Kinabalu, with the
remaining ten percent owned by subsidiaries of Presidio. 36
In order to provide a portion of the funding needed for these invest-
ments, Nix and Patterson each contributed $1.5 million to his respective indi-
vidual Partnership. 37 To provide the remaining capital needed for the initial
investments, Nix and Patterson entered into credit agreements with National
Westminster Bank (NatWest). 38 NatWest loaned Patterson and Nix each
25. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex re. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568
F.3d 537, 540-41 (5th Cir. 2009).
26. Id. at 541.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Stage one would last for sixty days. Id. At that time, stage two would
begin and last until day 180. Id. Then, the remaining seven-year investment would
be stage three. Id.
30. Id.
31. IRS.gov, Limited Liability Company (LLC), http://www.irs.gov/businesses
/small/article/0,,id=98277,00.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
32. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 541.
33. A single-member LLC is a limited liability company that is formed with one
owner or member, and that owner chooses to have the entity disregarded for tax pur-
poses. IRS.gov, Single Member Limited Liability Companies, http://www.irs.gov
/businesses/small/article/0,,id=158625,00.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). Essentially,
the entity is treated as a sole proprietorship for federal income tax purposes. Id.
34. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 541. Nix and Patterson were the owners of Rogue and







Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss4/9
2010] A LOOK INTO THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
$66.7 million in capital. 39 This loan amount was comprised of $41.7 million
as the stated principal amount and $25 million as a loan premium.40 The loan
premium was designated as an "exchange" for paying an above-market inter-
est rate on the principal.41 The $25 million loan premium was required to be
repaid if Nix or Patterson paid off the loan early, but if they paid over the
seven-year life of the loan, they would not have to repay the loan premium.42
The $66.7 million that each partner withdrew from NatWest was contributed
to their respective Partnerships, and the corresponding loan obligations were
assigned to the Partnerships.43 Each Partnership then made investments in
short-term forward contracts on foreign currencies.44
To execute these investments, the Partnerships deposited the capital
provided into accounts controlled by NatWest.45 NatWest then invested in
46the foreign currencies on behalf of the Partnerships. The foreign currency
investments earned interest that NatWest paid to the Partnerships, and, in
turn, the Partnerships paid NatWest interest on the loans assumed from Nix
and Patterson. 47 However, the interest paid to the Partnerships on the curren-
cy investments was less than the interest payments due on the loans from
NatWest.48 Thus, the Partnerships realized "negative carry" costs on these
investments. 49 Although this may have been reason enough to exit the in-
vestments, Patterson had other investments at the time that made him recon-
sider his dealings with Presidio.so
Prior to investing with Presidio, Patterson had invested in a local bank.5'
This banking investment was going to require Patterson to invest additional
52




42. Id. Essentially, they were paying above-average interest rates on the $41.7
million as a substitution for paying any interest on the additional $25 million as a
"loan premium." Id. If the loan was paid off early, this benefit would not have been
recognized by the bank. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885,




49. Id. "Negative carry" costs simply mean that the partnerships were paying
more in interest on the loans than they were earning from the foreign investments. Id.
50. Id. at 892-93.
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the Presidio investment and the local bank obligation, Patterson opted to
withdraw from his foreign currency investments.53 Nix followed suit.54
From 2000 through 2002, Patterson, through Klamath's activities,
claimed total losses of $25,277,202; Nix, through Kinabalu's activities,
claimed losses of $25,272,344." The foreign currency transactions that Nix
and Patterson had entered into also caused significant losses to the Partner-
ships; however, a partner can claim losses only up to the partner's basis,
which is the capital that he or she has invested in the partnership. If a part-
nership also assumes the liabilities of the partner, the amount of the liabilities
assumed is subtracted from the partner's basis. 57 In this case, Nix and Patter-
son each contributed a total of $68.2 million to his respective Partnership;
however, each Partnership also assumed the liabilities from NatWest." In
making the basis calculations, Nix and Patterson did not consider the $25
million loan premiums as liabilities, and thus only subtracted the $41.7 mil-
lion principal amounts.59 Accordingly, each claimed a basis in his respective
Partnership interest of approximately $25.3 million.60 This allowed Patterson





55. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568
F.3d 537, 542 (5th Cir. 2009).
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 752(b) (2006) (IRS' guidelines for calculation of
partner basis). For example, if a partner contributes $200,000 of capital and the part-
nership assumes $100,000 of liabilities, then the partner's basis would only be
$100,000.
58. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 542.
59. Id.
60. Id.
Specifically, the losses occurred when Patterson received 67,341.88 Euros





Advisory fee to Pollans & Cohen 250,000
Cash distributions from Klamath (359,635)
Klamath partnership loss (1,165,279)
Basis 25,316,393
Id at 542 n.2.
61. Id. at 542.
1414 [Vol. 75
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The Internal Revenue Service (the Service) disagreed with Patterson's
interpretation of section 752 of the Internal Revenue Code. 62 The Service
argued that according to I.R.C. § 752, the loan premium received by Patterson
should have been included in the liabilities assumed by the Partnership.
The Service contended that the entire $66.7 million that Patterson received
from NatWest was a liability and should have been treated as such when cal-
culating Patterson's basis in the Partnership. 4 The Service felt that the struc-
ture of the transactions had no economic purpose other than to avoid tax lia-
bility.6s For this reason, the Service issued final partnership administrative
adjustments (FPAAs) to Klamath and Kinabalu that altered Nix and Patter-
son's basis calculations, disallowed certain deductions taken for operational
expenses, and assessed penalties to Nix and Patterson for their underpayment
of income tax liabilities.66
After being issued the FPAAs, the Partnerships filed suit against the
67
government to challenge the adjustments. Initially, the district court denied
the Government's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the
partners' basis calculations and deemed the calculations to be proper.68 How-
ever, following a bench trial, the district court held that the loan premiums
were in fact liabilities and should not have been included in the partners' ba-
sis. The district court supported this decision by finding that neither the
investors nor the bank intended to remain in the loan transaction for the full
seven years, thus making the reason for the loan premium moot.70 However,
62. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 752.
63. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 542.
64. Id.
65. Id. "A 'tax shelter' includes, among other things, a partnership or an invest-
ment plan 'if a significant purpose of such . . . is the avoidance or evasion of Federal
income tax."' Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d
885, 900-01 (E.D. Tex. 2007), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 568 F.3d 537 (5th
Cir. 2009); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) (2000) (defining "tax shelter" in
the I.R.C.). Section 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) has since been amended, but the discussion
above applies the 2000 version of the statute. Compare 26 U.S.C. §
6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) (2000), with 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2006).
66. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 542.
67. Id.
68. Id at 542-43.
69. See id at 543.
70. Klamath, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 896, 898. The partners stated that the reason for
the structure of the loan with an above-market interest rate and the separate loan pre-
mium was to protect the bank from the increased risk at each stage of investment as
well as the risk of early repayment by the partners. Id. at 897. However, if the part-
ners never intended to remain in the investment until these later stages and always
intended to repay the loans early, then the "premium" was never a contingency or a
legitimate protection against risk in the later stages of the investment. See id. at 896.
1415
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the district court disagreed with the Service's decision to deny the deduction
of operational expenses and assess penalties. 71
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court and held that the loan
transactions by Patterson and Nix did not have sufficient economic substance
to be recognized for federal income tax purposes and thus constituted "sham
transaction[s]" or "tax shelter[s]."72 Thus, the Fifth Circuit decided to follow
the economic substance test practiced in the majority of circuits.73 All cir-
cuits determine the validity of a particular transaction for federal income tax
purposes by applying a two-prong test:74 (1) whether the transaction has any
economic effect upon the entities or parties involved apart from tax purposes
and (2) whether the transaction has any valid business purpose apart from
income tax considerations.7  However, a majority of circuits will consider a
transaction a sham and therefore invalid for federal income tax purposes if the
76transaction fails only one of these prongs. By contrast, the minority does
not classify a transaction as a sham unless the transaction fails both prongs
and therefore has no purpose other than tax avoidance. 77
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Service has recognized that decreasing the number of abusive tax
shelters is a primary concern.78 Tax shelters are transactions that are struc-
tured to inappropriately avoid taxes by a number of different methods.79
Over the years, the Service has established a number of "listed transactions"
that help taxpayers quickly identify tax shelters and structure their transac-
tions accordingly.so There are some transactions that violate the Code and
some transactions that violate the Treasury Regulations (the Regulations).
Other transactions are not prohibited by either the Code or the Regulations.82
It is these transactions that often pose the most problems for taxpayers and
practitioners.
Transactions that did not run afoul of the Code or Regulations, but were
nevertheless troublesome, forced the Service to use the judicial doctrine
71. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 543.
72. Id. at 540, 544-45, 549.
73. See infra Part Ill.A.
74. See infra Part Ill.A.
75. See infra Part Ill.A.
76. See infra Part Il.A.
77. See infra Part III.B.
78. Korb, supra note 1, at 1, 16 (the speech, given in 2005, noted that a resur-
gence of tax shelter activity had been occurring in the past ten years and, thus, that the
Service must "identify and challenge" abusive tax shelters).
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 2.
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known as the economic substance doctrine, which has now been codified.84
This doctrine assists in the interpretation of statutory language and is not
meant to contradict congressional intent regarding particular sections of the
Code. Essentially, the Service is concerned about those transactions that
satisfy the literal language of the Code but are contrary to congressional in-
tent.86 One law professor stated that the economic substance test is of crucial
importance to the tax system because it keeps both the Service and practition-
ers in line with the goals and purposes of the Code.87
As the Supreme Court explained, "taxpayers have the right to decrease
or avoid taxes by legally permissible means.' In Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States, the Supreme Court noted that where
there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic sub-
stance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory
realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not
shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless la-
bels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights
89
and duties effectuated by the parties.
Unquestionably, a taxpayer may not reap tax benefits from a transaction
that is wholly lacking in economic substance, 90 but the appropriate test for
determining economic substance is unsettled among the circuits.
All circuits abide by a "two-prong" approach when examining whether
transactions should be upheld for federal income tax purposes.91 The first
prong looks at whether a transaction has some rational, nontax business pur-
pose "in light of the taxpayer's conduct and economic situation."92 This
prong is a subjective test that looks to the intent of the taxpayer when struc-
83. Id. at 3-4. A transaction can be a "factual sham" if it has been recorded as
occurring but has not actually occurred. Id. at 4. These are not the transactions dis-
cussed in this Note. See supra Part II. While factual shams were once a very signifi-
cant problem for the Service, the more pressing issue discussed in this Note is the
problem of determining the tax consequences of transactions that have actually oc-
curred. See infra Parts IV-V.
84. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (West 2010).
85. Korb, supra note 1, at 6-7.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 5-6.
88. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568
F.3d 537, 543 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469
(1935)).
89. 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978).
90. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
91. See infra Part III.A-B.
92. Korb, supra note 1, at 7.
1417
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turing and entering into the transaction.93 The second prong analyzes whether
the transaction has some meaningful enhancement or effects on the taxpayer's
economic position other than to reduce taxes. 94 The second prong is an ob-
jective test that examines the economic changes that arise from the transac-
tion.95
There are several ways that this test can be interpreted. One approach
would be to look at both prongs as a general tax shelter test or "factor" ap-
proach, such that they are both factors to consider in determining whether the
overall transaction has practical economic substance but both factors are not
96
required. However, the alternative view would be to apply the test in a rigid
two-prong fashion and require a transaction to have both factors to be consi-
dered a legitimate transaction for income tax purposes. 97 Even among those
circuits that use this test in a "rigid" two-prong fashion there is disagreement.
Some circuits apply this test "disjunctively: a transaction will have economic
substance [and thus be considered legitimate] if the taxpayer had either a
nontax business purpose or the transaction had objective economic sub-
stance[,]" which is essentially a two-prong "either/or" approach (disjunctive
98two-prong). Other circuits apply this test in a harsher conjunctive fashion
by requiring a transaction to have both a business purpose and economic sub-
stance to be found legitimate; this is a two-prong "both" approach (conjunc-
tive two-prong). 99
The distinctions among these different tests are infinitesimal, yet of sig-
nificant importance. There would, in theory, seem to be three ways to ap-
proach this two-prong test to economic substance; however, as applied by the
courts, there are only two approaches.
93. Id. This "subjective" view looks at whether the taxpayer could have made a
profit or had some valid business reason for the transaction. Id. at 9. These factors
may include (1) "whether a profit was even possible;" (2) "whether the taxpayer had a
nontax business reason to engage in the transaction;" (3) whether the transaction was
adequately investigated; (4) whether the entities were separate from the taxpayer; (5)
whether the transaction was at arms-length; and (6) the marketing of the transaction in
question. Id. at 9-10.
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 8. This test relies on neither prong individually but looks more at the
totality of the circumstances. Id.
97. Id.
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A. Majority Approach
The first approach to the economic substance test is a combination of the
"factor" approach and the conjunctive two-prong approach. This method is
used by the majority of the circuits. While in theory the approaches taken by
these circuits can be articulated as separate approaches to the economic sub-
stance test, in practice they are almost indistinguishable.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit follows a combination
of the conjunctive two-prong test and the "factor" approach. For example, in
Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, the court felt that the pertinent factor
in determining the economic substance of a transaction is the objective view
of how the transaction is structured. 0 0 The court acknowledged that subjec-
tive motivation was pertinent to the tax avoidance purpose, but found that the
objective reality of the economic substance of a transaction is the key factor
in determining whether to recognize a transaction for federal income tax pur-
101
poses.
Similarly, in Schell v. United States, the Federal Circuit reached a deci-
sion based solely upon the objective economic substance of a particular trans-
action, and not on the subjective motives of the taxpayers.1 02 Therefore, in
the Federal Circuit, transactions are required to have an economic effect on
the taxpayer's financial situation, and, if an economic effect is found, then a
valid business purpose may also be considered in determining whether the
transaction is a "sham."',
0 3
In Nicole Rose Corp. v. Commissioner, the Second Circuit defined a
"sham" transaction as one that is "'fictitious or. . . has no business purpose or
economic effect other than the creation of tax deductions."" 0 The court did
not discuss the issue of business purpose; however, by finding that the trans-
action in question had no economic substance and would not be recognized
100. 454 F.3d 1340, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
101. Id. at 1356. The court must analyze the specific transaction that gave rise to
the tax benefit and not other subsequent or related transactions. Id. at 1357.
102. See 589 F.3d 1378, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
103. See id.
104. 320 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting DeMartino v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d
400, 406 (2d Cir. 1988)). This case involved several complicated transactions where
computer equipment was sold between foreign corporations, leased back to the selling
company, and then payment on these leases was assigned to yet another company. Id.
at 283. The Director of Nicole Rose Corp. assisted in renegotiations between the
companies for the payments on the leases. Id. This renegotiation at first included a
reduction in payment and the continued leasing of the equipment. Id. Subsequently,
a restructuring resulted in the assignment of the payments on the leases to Nicole
Rose. Id. Nicole Rose's interest in these payments was then immediately "trans-
ferred," leaving the company with a substantial tax loss. Id. at 283-84.
1419
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for tax purposes, 05 this holding provides an inference that the Second Circuit
will find that a transaction has no economic substance based solely on the
failure of one prong. Like the Federal Circuit, the Second Circuit essentially
looked at the two factors as an overall consideration of the particular transac-
tion, focusing first on the economic effect of the transaction and then analyz-
ing the business purpose if necessary.106
The Sixth Circuit abides by a similar combination of the factor approach
and the conjunctive two-prong test.' 07 Although in a recent case the court
never reached the second prong, the Sixth Circuit noted that if economic sub-
stance were found, then the subjective inquiry into a business motive might
be made. os What is slightly different about the Sixth Circuit's test, as com-
pared to the tests adopted by the Third and Fourth Circuits, discussed below,
is that the Sixth Circuit determines whether the transaction is a sham based
solely on the economic substance of the transaction.' 09 Then, if the transac-
tion has economic substance, the court may look into the business purpose for
making other determinations regarding tax liability.'io Therefore, although
the court appears to be taking a two-prong approach, in reality it is basing its
decision solely on economic substance."1  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
may take a two-step approach, but will deem a transaction a sham based on
only one prong of the test if necessary.
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also applies the two-prong test,
but, while the Sixth Circuit focuses more heavily on the economic effect of a
transaction,112 the Ninth Circuit follows a more balanced approach and ex-
amines both factors." The Ninth Circuit looks at the objective economic
substance of the transaction, together with the subjective business motives of
the taxpayer aside from tax avoidance.1 4 The wording used by the Ninth
Circuit indicates that a transaction will be labeled a sham if it fails either
prong of the test. This more closely follows the conjunctive two-prong ap-
105. Id. at 284.
106. Korb, supra note 1, at 8.
107. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006).
108. Id. at 599.
109. Rose v. Comm'r, 868 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1989).
110. Id. Essentially, this means that if a transaction has no economic substance,
the court will automatically consider the transaction a sham for federal income tax
purposes. If the transaction has economic substance, the transaction will likely be
deemed valid for federal income tax purposes, but depending on the business purpose,
it may still run into trouble with other sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
I 11. Id.
112. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
113. Robertson v. Comm'r, 5 F. App'x 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001).
114. Id. The Ninth Circuit further defines economic substance as "a reasonable
opportunity for profit in addition to the ... tax avoidance" opportunities. Id.
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proach that requires the transaction to meet both the subjective and objective
measures, rather than the general tax shelter method." 5
The Tenth Circuit has also followed a fairly strict conjunctive two-prong
approach to the economic substance test that allows a transaction to be invali-
dated for federal income tax purposes if it fails either of the prongs.1 6 The
Eleventh Circuit has somewhat danced around the issue of subjective intent in
determining a sham transaction;1 7 however, the case that has binding
precedent in the Eleventh Circuit states that the two-prong test of subjective
business purpose along with objective economic substance should be used to
evaluate the validity of a particular transaction for federal income tax purpos-
es." 8 Consequently, only one prong need be disproved for the transaction to
be considered a sham."l 9
Because under the majority approach the failure to meet only one of the
prongs will render the transaction a sham, more transactions will be found to
be sham transactions that are invalidated for federal income tax purposes. In
following this harsher approach, the courts that form the majority have fo-
cused on the language of the United States Supreme Court in Frank Lyon Co.
v. United States, which states that a transaction is legitimate when it has
"economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regu-
latory realities, [and] is imbued with tax-independent considerations." 20
However, these courts have failed to give the same consideration to the latter
part of this statement by the Court, which emphasizes that a transaction
should not be "shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless
labels attached."l 2 1 The minority view focuses on this latter part of the
Court's assertion.
115. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
116. Keeler v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001).
117. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.
2001) (stating only that a transaction must have more than tax avoidance purposes to
be recognized as valid for federal income tax purposes); United Parcel Serv. of Am.,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that even if a transac-
tion has economic substance, it will be considered a sham transaction if it lacks a
business purpose); Kirchman v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (stat-
ing only that a valid transaction must have "economic effects other than the creation
of tax benefits").
118. Karr v. Comm'r, 924 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1991).
119. See id.
120. 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978).
121. Id. at 584.
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B. Minority Approach
The test used by a minority of circuits is the disjunctive two-prong test.
These circuits place considerable weight on the language of the Supreme
Court that an economic sham is one that is "shaped solely by tax-avoidance
features that have meaningless labels attached." 22 These courts believe that
the Supreme Court merely requires that the transaction have some legitimate
purpose and structure, whether it be an economic or a business purpose.
In In re CMHoldings, Inc., the Third Circuit clearly stated that two as-
pects should be explored in identifying a sham transaction for federal income
tax purposes.123 The court deemed these two prongs an "objective economic
substance" test and a "subjective business motivation" test, and stated that
they are not "'discrete prongs of a 'rigid two-step analysis,' but rather
represent related factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the
transaction had sufficient substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be
respected for tax purposes."'l24 In fact, in another case, the Third Circuit
went even further and stated that the test does not require both prongs to be
met for a transaction to be considered legitimate, but the transaction only
need satisfy one of the factors.125 In ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, the
Third Circuit stated:
While it is clear that a transaction . . . that has neither objective
non-tax economic effects nor subjective non-tax purposes consti-
tutes an economic sham whose tax consequences must be disre-
garded, and equally clear that a transaction that has both objective
non-tax economic significance and subjective non-tax purposes
constitutes an economically substantive transaction whose tax con-
sequences must be respected, it is also well established that where
a transaction objectively affects the taxpayer's net economic posi-
tion, legal relations, or non-tax business interests, it will not be dis-
regarded merely because it was motivated by tax considerations.126
The Third Circuit went on to note that, in conjunction with the subjective
portion of the economic substance doctrine, the nontax avoidance motive
should be one that was intended by Congress.12 7
122. Id.
123. 301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2002).
124. Id. (quoting ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998)).
125. ACMP'ship, 157 F.3d at 247.
126. Id. at 248 n.31 (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468-69 (1935)).
127. CMJHoldings, Inc., 301 F.3d at 106.
If Congress intends to encourage an activity, and to use taxpayers' desire
to avoid taxes as a means to do it, then a subjective motive of tax avoid-
ance is permissible. But to engage in an activity solely for the purpose of
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Similarly, the Fourth Circuit stated in Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v.
Commissioner that a proper reading of Frank Lyon suggested that "a two-
pronged inquiry [is required] to determine whether a transaction is, for tax
purposes, a sham."l 28 According to the court, this test required the taxpayer
to show that he or she was motivated by a business purpose other than tax
avoidance and that the transaction had economic substance beyond tax bene-
fits.129 Essentially, the Fourth Circuit concluded that when a transaction had
no use other than tax avoidance, it should be considered a sham transaction -
basically applying the disjunctive two-prong test.130  In a later case, the
Fourth Circuit laid out a test similar to that of the Third Circuit. 1 The court
reiterated that this is a two-prong test that looks at the subjective business
purpose behind the transaction as well as the objective economic substance,
such that as long as a transaction satisfies one prong the transaction will be
deemed legitimate.' 32
The District of Columbia Circuit has also followed the disjunctive two-
prong test.' 33 The D.C. Circuit stated that, to deem a transaction a sham and
thus to invalidate an otherwise legitimate transaction, a court must find that
the transaction lacks both economic substance and business purpose.134 Es-
sentially, the court looks for some reason for the transaction other than tax
avoidance.135 When some other reason exists, such as economic substance or
business purpose, then the transaction will not be deemed a sham.136 In fact,
this circuit quoted a Fourth Circuit case noting that "'[t]o treat a transaction
as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated by no business
purpose other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that
the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility
of profit exists.""
37
In a more recent case, the D.C. Circuit applied this test to several part-
nerships that were formed in favorable foreign tax jurisdictions.138 After the
partnerships were formed there were a series of transactions that allowed the
avoiding taxes where that is not the statute's goal is to conduct an eco-
nomic sham.
Id
128. 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985).
129. Id at 91.
130. Id at 92.
131. Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2006).
132. Id.




137. Id (emphasis added) (quoting Friedman v. Comm'r, 869 F.2d 785, 792 (4th
Cir. 1989)).
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partnerships in the foreign jurisdictions to register large gains and allowed the
U.S. corporation to register large losses without actually realizing the
losses.' 39 The D.C. Circuit determined that the correct law to apply to the
transaction was the "business purpose doctrine." 40 This doctrine specifies
that although a taxpayer may structure a business to minimize the tax burden,
the transaction must have a legitimate business purpose other than tax avoid-
141
ance.
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, both the conjunctive and the
disjunctive two-prong approaches find support from the Supreme Court's
language. Thus, the resolution of this split among the circuits centers pri-
marily on a determination of which circuits have focused on the correct por-
tion of the Supreme Court's language in applying the economic substance
test.
C. Economic Substance Codification
Piggybacking on the new health care bill, the economic substance doc-
trine is now codified in I.R.C. § 7701(o).142 The language of the new statute
requires a conjunctive two-prong approach like that of the majority. 4 3 This
approach requires that a transaction have both a meaningful change in the
taxpayer's economic position other than tax avoidance and a substantial pur-
pose other than tax avoidance.144 Although at face value this seems exactly
like the majority position discussed above,145 there are significant penalties
and other requirements included that make this codification different.146 In
conjunction with the amendment to I.R.C. § 7701(o), I.R.C. § 6662 has also
been amended to add certain penalties for the violation of section 7701.147 If
a taxpayer violates the economic substance doctrine, he or she may face a
twenty percent underpayment penalty or potentially a forty percent under-
payment penalty if the position the taxpayer took when filing his or her tax
139. Id.
140. Id. at 630.
141. Id. at 631.
142. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (West 2010) (also known as I.R.C. § 7701(o)).
143. Id. § 7701(o)(1); see also supra Part Il.A.
144. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o). The statutory requirements apply only to transactions
entered into for profit or in connection with a trade or business. I.R.S. Notice 2010-
62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411. Additionally, the term "transaction," as defined by the stat-
ute, includes a series of transactions. Id.
145. See supra Part III.A.
146. Jeremiah Coder, Will Economic Substance Codification be Worth 1?, 127
TAX NOTES 16 (2010).
147. Id.; see also Heath Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(6)); 26
U.S.C. § 6662(b)(6).
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return was not previously disclosed.'48 Also, I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2) and (d)(2)
were added to eliminate the reasonable cause exception that allowed the tax-
payer to avoid the assessment of penalties if he or she had acted on reasona-
ble cause and in good faith in a transaction.149 Whereas before, the economic
substance doctrine was based largely on determinations of facts and circums-
tances, the new statutory language is much more rigid and applies a strict
liability for the taxpayer if he assesses a transaction incorrectly.150
Exactly how this new doctrine will play out will depend on the Service's
guidance. '5 Even so, some of the potential effects of this codification can be
seen in the recent Fifth Circuit case Klamath Strategic Investment Fund ex
rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States.'52
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The issue in Klamath was whether the loan transactions entered into by
Nix and Patterson were in fact valid transactions recognizable for federal
income tax purposes.' 53 Although many circuits have laid out the specific
test that they use for finding economic substance, the Fifth Circuit had not yet
decided the issue. In Klamath, the Fifth Circuit finally had the opportunity to
determine its test for economic substance.154
The court first discussed the fact that the doctrine generally prevents
taxpayers from structuring transactions purely for tax purposes.' 55 The Fifth
Circuit noted that although the Supreme Court has recognized the taxpayer's
ability to avoid taxes by legal means,'56 these means must change the flow of
economic benefits to be considered legitimate for tax purposes.157 The Su-
preme Court articulated the flow of economic benefits as "'compelled or en-
couraged by business or regulatory realities ... imbued with tax-independent
considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have
148. Coder, supra note 146, at 16; see also Heath Care and Education Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2010 § 1409; 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(6), (i).
149. Coder, supra note 146, at 16; see also Heath Care and Education Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2010 § 1409; 26 U.S.C. § 6664; 26 C.F.R. § 1.66644 (2010).
150. Coder, supra note 146, at 16. For example, the new code section specifies
that using the potential for profit to meet the requirements of § 7701 (o)(1) requires a
showing that "the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit is substantial
in relation to the present value of the claimed net tax benefits." I.R.S. Notice 2010-
62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411.
151. Coder, supra note 146, at 16.
152. 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); see also infra Part IV.
153. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 543.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
157. Id. (citing Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1940)).
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meaningless labels attached."" 5 8 However, in determining whether a particu-
lar transaction is lacking economic substance, the Fifth Circuit recognized
that the law is somewhat unsettled within the Fifth Circuit, as well as other
circuits. 159
In Klamath, the Fifth Circuit deemed the majority view among the cir-
cuits the proper interpretation of the economic substance doctrine.160 The
majority view states that a lack of economic substance alone is sufficient to
negate a transaction, despite other considerations and reasons for structuring a
transaction in a particular way.161 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Su-
preme Court had essentially set up a multi-factor test to determine whether a
transaction is legitimately structured.162 According to the court, if any factor
is lacking, then the transaction as a whole fails the economic substance test.'63
The court ruled that this is true "even if the taxpayer[] profess[es some other]
genuine business purpose without [a] tax-avoidance motivation[]."'6 In
reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit fell in line with the majority of circuits
in focusing on the language of the Supreme Court that lists both economic
realities and business purpose as factors to look at in a questionable business
transaction.
Originally, the district court deemed Nix and Patterson's transactions to
lack economic substance based on several factors.166  First, the partners
claimed that the structure of the loans was designed to protect NatWest from
the future risk inherent in the latter stages of the foreign currency transac-
tions.167 However, the district court found that neither the investors nor the
bank ever intended to reach the latter stages of this investment strategy.168
The high-risk transactions would not occur until stage three in the investment
strategy, at which time the protective structure of the loans would be re-
158. Id. (quoting Frank Lyon, Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978)).
159. Id. at 544.
160. Id.; see, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th
Cir. 2001); ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998); James v.
Comm'r, 899 F.2d 905, 908-09 (10th Cir. 1990).
161. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 544.
162. Id. These factors include "whether the transaction (1) has economic sub-
stance compelled by business or regulatory realities, (2) is imbued with tax-
independent considerations, and (3) is not shaped totally by tax-avoidance features."
Id. (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84).
163. Id.
164. Id
165. See supra Parts II, IlI.A.
166. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 546. The Fifth Circuit decided the elements of this
case based upon the economic substance doctrine and not by the classification of
liabilities under 26 U.S.C. § 752. Id.
167. Id. at 544-45.
168. Id. at 545.
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quired.169 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit examined numerous bank documents
that further supported the conclusion that neither of the investors intended to
keep the loans outstanding past the seventy-day mark, and that if the investors
chose to continue the investments, NatWest would force the investors out. 170
The court felt that the lack of intention to remain in the loans as shown by
these documents clearly indicated that the loans were merely a sham.171
Second, the district court felt that the claimed profit motives were not
relevant to the loan transactions.17 The district court stated that taxpayers
could not combine multiple transactions to find "profit motive," but instead
must look at specific transactions.173 In this case, the district court felt that
the low-risk investments that were actually made came from the $1.5 million
capital invested by the partners' personal funds.174 Therefore, although the
partners may have been seeking a profit through investments, this was not a
proper consideration in looking at the structure of the loans from NatWest. 7 1
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that these transactions lacked
economic substance, that the profit motive for related transactions was not
relevant, and that the transactions would be disregarded for tax purposes.176
The economic substance of these transactions, or lack thereof, was the
pivotal issue in Klamath. However, after determining that the loan transac-
tions were tax shelters, there were several related issues that the court had to
consider.177 The first issue was the imposition of penalties for the partners'
underpayment of tax liabilities. The government contested the jurisdiction
of the district court to determine whether penalties were appropriate and also
challenged the finding that penalties could not be assessed.179 The Fifth Cir-
169. Id. The $25 million loan premium and above-market interest rate were origi-
nally part of the loan as a protection for NatWest in loaning to Nix and Patterson in
their high-risk investment. Id. at 541.
170. Id. at 544-45.
171. Id at 545.
172. Id. at 544.
173. Id. at 545.
174. Id.
175. Id. If the investments had reached the final stages where the funds from the
loan would be required, the Fifth Circuit may have viewed these transactions differ-
ently.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 545-46.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 546-47. Under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TERFA), a court in which a petition is filed has the jurisdiction to make all determi-
nations of partnership items for a particular taxable year, including any applicable
penalties. Id. at 547. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court had the jurisdiction
to assess penalties and deemed that "'[n]o penalty shall be imposed under section
6662 or 6663 with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there
was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with
respect to such portion."' Id (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2006)). However, the
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cuit held that the partners relied on valid sources for advice in structuring and
reporting these transactions and, therefore, penalties should not be assessed in
this case.iso
The second of these derivative issues was the deduction of operational
expenses taken out on these loan transactions. The court determined that
both Nix and Patterson had profit-seeking motives, which allowed them to
deduct the operational expenses tied to these investment strategies.182 The
final secondary issue addressed was the collateral estoppel concern raised by
the government. The government had several pending matters against Pre-
sidio, the investment firm involved in this case.184 The court held that the
issues determined in this case (the economic substance doctrine) would have
no collateral estoppel effect on other pending litigation against Presidio.
Ultimately, while the court supported the government's arguments that the
loan transactions lacked economic substance, the court did not support the
appellate court also determined that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to
order the Service to issue a refund. Id. at 552. Instead, the Fifth Circuit required the
partners to seek a refund through administrative proceedings pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §
7422. Id This is one area where the new statutory provisions will most significantly
alter the economic substance doctrine. In this case, the court found that the partners
were not liable for penalties because they had reasonable cause and good faith to have
structured the transactions in this manner. Id at 548. However, in light of the new
statutory provisions, the partners would have been liable for penalties between twenty
to forty percent of the tax liability underpayment. See supra Part IlI.C.
180. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 548. The appellate court determines this based upon
the "'quality and objectivity of the professional advice which they obtained."' Id.
(quoting Swayze v. United States, 785 F.2d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 1986)). The appellate
court looked into the sources of the partners' due diligence in this case and deemed
the sources legitimate. Id
181. Id. at 545-46. Generally, deductions for operational expenses are not al-
lowed on transactions that have been disregarded for federal income tax purposes. Id.
at 549. However, after extensive discussion, the appellate court determined that the
proper test was to determine the profit-seeking motives of the investors and to allow
the deduction of expenses according to this motive. Id. at 550.
182. Id.; see supra note 181 and accompanying text.
183. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 546.
184. Id. The government argued that even though it was the prevailing party, this
ruling might have adverse effects on subsequent litigation against the accounting firm
Presidio. Id. A party that claims collateral estoppel only has standing where it can
show that "the ultimate judgment in [a] case was 'dependent' on the earlier adverse
ruling." Id. (citing In re DES Litig., 7 F.3d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1993)). Here, there was
no adverse ruling against the government except in the minor issues of penalty as-
sessment and operating expense deduction. Id. In fact, the government feared any
collateral estoppel on the determination of these loans as a liability under 26 U.S.C. §
752. Id. However, the issue of whether these loans qualified as liabilities was not
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government's claims for denying deductions on related business expenses or
its claim for underpayment of tax liability penalties.
V. COMMENT
The Eighth Circuit has already addressed the economic substance doc-
trine and has chosen to follow the majority of circuits in IES Industries, Inc.
v. United States.187 The JES Industries opinion provides significant insight as
to why the majority's test has been so highly ambiguous. The Eighth Circuit
cited the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rice's Toyota World as persuasive au-
thority in determining how to assess a transaction's validity for federal in-
come tax purposes. The Eighth Circuit purported to use the disjunctive
two-prong test set out in Rice's Toyota World but suggested, as it did in
Shriver v. Commissioner,189 that a transaction is a sham if it fails either
prong.190 The Shriver case laid out why the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the
disjunctive two-prong approach in Rice's Toyota World but then read the
language of Frank Lyon differently than the Fourth Circuit.' 9' The Eighth
Circuit explained that the Fourth Circuit's test is certainly supported by the
Supreme Court's language of Frank Lyon, but is not required by that deci-
sion.192 What is contradictory about the language of the Fourth Circuit's test
is the emphasis on the rigidity of the Fourth Circuit's application of the dis-
junctive two-prong test. As many courts have done, the Eighth Circuit found
that by looking at both prongs of the economic substance test in the disjunc-
tive, either/or context, the Fourth Circuit's test is in fact the more rigid of the
two approaches.193 The courts feel this is the more rigid approach because it
requires two factors to be considered, whereas the conjunctive two-prong test
only looks to one factor.194
However, the context of the transaction being assessed in Frank Lyon
suggests that the majority's conjunctive two-prong test is actually the more
rigid approach. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, the taxpayer, Frank Lyon
Co. (Lyon), was involved in a sale-leaseback transaction. '1 Lyon agreed to
purchase a building from Worthen Bank and Trust Company.196 Worthen
186. Id. at 553.
187. 253 F.3d 350, 353-54 (8th Cir. 2001).
188. Id. (citing Rice's Toyota World v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir.
1985)).
189. 899 F.2d 724, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1990).
190. IES Indus., Inc., 253 F.3d at 353-54.
191. Shriver, 899 F.2d at 727.
192. Id.
193. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex ret. St. Croix Ventures v. United States,
568 F.3d 538, 544 (5th Cir. 2009).
194. See Shriver, 899 F.2d at 727.
195. 435 U.S. 561, 565 (1978).
196. Id. at 566.
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planned to finance and build a new bank across the street from its local com-
petition. 197 Unfortunately for Worthen, because of the planned financing for
the transaction and Worthen's current capital structure, the Federal Reserve
required it to restructure its financing in order to move forward with the con-
struction of the building.'9 Lyon came in during the restructuring process.
Lyon agreed to buy the building from Worthen and then allow Worthen to
lease the building from it for a specified number of years with options to pur-
chase at set time periods.199 Upon an audit of Lyon's tax return, the Service
claimed that there was no legitimate purpose for the transaction and it should
200be classified as a sham for federal income tax purposes.
After analyzing the facts of Frank Lyon, the Supreme Court made its
famous statement on economic substance:
[W]e hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party
transaction with economic substance which is compelled or en-
couraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-
independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-
avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Gov-
ernment should honor the allocation of rights and duties effec-
tuated by the parties. Expressed another way, so long as the lessor
retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor
status, the form of the transaction adopted by the parties governs
201for tax purposes.
Essentially, the Supreme Court looked at the transaction as a whole;
analyzed different economic, business, and regulatory factors; and determined
that, because some of these factors were present, the transaction should be
202
respected for income tax purposes.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the "question for determina-
tion" was whether congressional intent in enacting a particular code section is
203taken into consideration when the transaction is structured. For example, if
a transaction follows the literal language of the Code but does not further the
purpose behind the Code, then that transaction is not valid for federal income
tax purposes. In fact, as seen in Frank Lyon,204 if the transaction was not
upheld for federal income tax purposes it would frustrate the purpose of some
197. Id. at 563.
198. Id. at 564. This was due to regulations placed on banks to keep them sound
for depositors. Id.
199. Id. at 564-65.
200. Id. at 568.
201. Id. at 583-84.
202. Id. at 582-84.
203. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960) (quoting Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
204. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
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Code sections and regulatory provisions. If the leaseback of the bank build-
ing were not allowed for federal income tax purposes, then the taxpayers
would be saddled with regulatory burdens to structure the transaction in a
particular way but then not enjoy the benefits of certain Code sections specif-
ically enumerated for such circumstances.205 Therefore, in finding congru-
ence with congressional intent, there may not always be both an economic
effect and a business purpose behind any particular transaction.
Although the economic substance doctrine has recently been codified, it
was done on the coattails of critical healthcare legislation that was almost
certain to pass regardless of the inclusion of menial provisions such as the
economic substance doctrine. 206 Congress repeatedly rejected the current
207
statutory language of the economic substance doctrine in previous years.
208
The proposals were criticized by government officials and commentators.
Many felt that clarifying this doctrine by codification would create an even
more rigid approach to the economic substance doctrine.209 It appears that
there may be some truth to this.
In the new statutory language, there are now even stricter guidelines for
the conjunctive two-prong test. 210 Although some courts have required this
211
conjunctive two-prong test for a number of years, the new statutory lan-
guage increases the barrier to meeting these requirements by adding language
such as "in a meaningful way" and "substantial purpose" when determining
whether a particular transaction has an economic effect and a business pur-
212
pose. Additionally, the definition of profit potential under the prior judicial
doctrine of economic substance was a reasonable expectation of "more than
an insignificant pretax profit." 213 However, now taxpayers will be required to
205. In this case, the taxpayer, Frank Lyon Co., was at risk of losing certain legi-
timate business deductions for the transaction with Worthen because the Service felt
that it was a sham. Id. at 573, 580-81.
206. See supra Part IlI.C; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (West 2010) (codification
of the economic substance doctrine); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); H.R. 3590, 111th Cong., (2d Sess. 2010) (new
healthcare legislation).
207. See supra Part I.
208. Legislative Proposals to Codify the Economic Substance Doctrine, 508 TAX
MGMT. (BNA) U.S. INCOME § VIll, at 2 (2008).
209. Id.
210. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o). The new statutorily defined conjunctive two-prong
test includes stricter guidelines than those of the older, judicially defined conjunctive
two-prong test.
211. See supra Part IlI.A.
212. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A)-(B). The new statutory provisions heighten the
standard that taxpayers have to meet before their transaction can be considered valid
for federal income tax purposes.
213. See Coder, supra note 146, at 18; see also Long Term Capital Holdings v.
United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 172 (D. Conn. 2004), aff'd, 150 F. App'x 40 (2d
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show that the profits will be substantial in comparison to the tax benefits re-
ceived from the transaction.214 Congress has taken the conjunctive two-prong
test of the judicial economic substance doctrine and made it even more diffi-
cult to satisfy. As the Supreme Court's landmark case Frank Lyon demon-
strates, this doctrine depends largely on the facts and circumstances of any
given case.215 However, the heightened burden now required by the statutory
language will eliminate many valid transactions because they cannot meet
this strict review.
Not only has the recent codification implemented stricter language, but
also the strict language is somewhat ambiguous.216 Whereas previously the
ambiguities in the doctrine likely kept taxpayers from abusing the economic
substance doctrine, these ambiguities may now inhibit taxpayers from enter-
ing into legitimate transactions for fear of the penalties that they may incur if
they structure a transaction, even inadvertently, in a way that does not meet
this new economic substance doctrine. For example, how is a taxpayer to
define "meaningful way" and "substantial purpose" when approaching a par-
ticular transaction? Is he or she to engage only in those transactions that dras-
tically change his or her economic position? The code specifies that the eco-
nomic substance doctrine is to be clarified by its common law corollary; 2 17
however, as can be seen above, the common law is somewhat confusing in
and of itself.218 And, if he or she guesses wrong, can he or she afford the
twenty to forty percent tax liability underpayment penalties? The Service
does not intend to issue any administrative guidance as to what specific trans-
actions will or will not be considered valid for federal income tax purposes
and instead expects the common law guidance to continue to develop. 219
Although society does not want taxpayers abusing the tax benefits that
Congress has provided in the Code, it also does not want to restrict taxpayer
movement within legitimate business transactions in a way that negates the
intent of Congress or, for that matter, in a way that stifles business and eco-
nomic growth.220 A more flexible approach to the economic substance test
Cir. 2005); Korb, supra note 1, at 10 (citing Gilman v. Comm'r, 933 F.2d 143, 146
(2d Cir. 1991)).
214. Coder, supra note 146, at 18. This is not only a higher burden as to the
amount of profit that is earned but also a higher burden as to the certainty that profit
will be earned.
215. Id. at 17-18; see also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
216. Coder, supra note 146, at 17-18.
217. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A).
218. See supra Part Ill.A-B.
219. I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 1.R.B. 411.
220. See Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy,
20 VA. TAX REv. 347, 354-56 (2000) ("Taxes not only claim billions of dollars from
citizens; they also influence billions of daily decisions - shaping, or misshaping, the
economy."); Bruce 1. Kogan, Taxation of Prizes and Awards - Tax Policy Winners
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would be ideal. This approach could still be codified if Congress so chooses.
However, if this is the course Congress wishes to take, the statutory language
should allow for flexibility, clearly define all terms, and reduce the strict lia-
bility penalties that now exist. By allowing this more flexible approach,
courts would be able to assess a transaction and effectively balance the needs
of taxpayers with the Service's need to enforce the Code and the congression-
al intent underlying it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has articulated several factors to assess when deter-
mining whether a transaction should be recognized for federal income tax
purposes. Several circuits have interpreted the Supreme Court's language to
require a finding of both prongs before a transaction is considered to have
economic substance, whereas other circuits have held that the prongs are
merely a list of factors to be considered in looking at a transaction. Congress
has taken it one step further by codifying the conjunctive two-prong test in a
very restrictive way. Although Supreme Court precedent could support either
approach, what is more important is the reasoning behind the Supreme
Court's holding. The Supreme Court has articulated that it is important for a
transaction to have a purpose other than tax avoidance, but also that a transac-
tion should imbue those characteristics that were intended by Congress in
221
enacting that particular code section. It is these two objectives that are
most important in applying the economic substance test to any transaction.
Therefore, it is critical to find a test that can best effectuate these two objec-
tives.
Although the majority claims that the minority view is a "rigid" ap-
proach to this test, in fact, the approach used by the majority, and now codi-
fied by Congress, may at times contradict the two objectives that the Supreme
Court has specifically articulated as critical to a finding of economic sub-
stance. Instead, the disjunctive approach used by the minority, an approach
that will allow flexibility in structuring transactions, is the better approach.
This flexibility will allow the reasonable businessperson to structure transac-
tions in ways that are best for his or her business and yet also capitalize on the
benefits intended by Congress through the Code. At times, the businessper-
son may find that a transaction is structured in a way that has a legitimate
business purpose but may not change his or her economic position, and vice
versa. By following the disjunctive two-prong test of the minority circuits,
courts could still analyze such transactions for legitimate economic substance
but have more flexibility in upholding a transaction.
and Losers, 63 WASH. L. REV. 257, 258 (1988) ("Tax policy now encourages produc-
tivity, economic efficiency, and competitiveness in the world marketplace.").
221. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978).
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